New Jersey Dept. Environmental v. American Thermoplastics Corp by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-2020 
New Jersey Dept. Environmental v. American Thermoplastics 
Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"New Jersey Dept. Environmental v. American Thermoplastics Corp" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 842. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/842 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 18-2865 & 19-2243 
________________ 
 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF 
 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; 





AMERICAN THERMOPLASTICS CORPORATION; 
BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS, INC.  
a/k/a Beckman Coulter Inc.; 
CADILLAC PLASTICS GROUP, INC. f/k/a/ Day 
International Corporation 
CWM CHEMICAL SERVICES, LLC;  
CHESTER HILLS, INC.; 
CHRYSLER CORPORATION; 
 COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION; 
COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION OF 
CONNECTICUT, INC.; 
COMPTON PRESS, INC.;  
CONNECTICUT RESOURCE  
RECOVERY AUTHORITY, INC.; 
EAGLE INDUSTRIES, INC.;  
EASTERN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.; 
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EMERSON QUIET KOOL CORPORATION; FALCON 
MANUFACTURING, INC.; 
JOHN C. FILIBERTO, in his individual capacity; 
JOSEPH B. FILIBERTO, in his individual capacity; 
J. FILIBERTO SANITATION, INC.;  
FLAIR CLEANERS OF MORRISTOWN, INC.; 
GARBCO ASSOCIATES, INC.; JAMES P HORAN, INC.; 
HOWMET CORPORATION  
a/k/a Howmet Turbine Components Corporation; 
 RAYONIER, INC. f/k/a ITT Rayonier, Inc.; 
KEUFFEL & ESSER COMPANY; 
MARS, INC.; THE MENNEN COMPANY;  
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION; 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC.; 
POLICASTRO SERVICE, INC.; 
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY; 
WARNER LAMBERT COMPANY, INC.; 
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEW JERSEY, INC., 
f/k/a/ Waste Management of North Jersey, Inc. 
 
COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION OF 
CONNECTICUT, INC.; 
COMPACTION SYSTESM CORPORATION  
(a New Jersey Corporation), 




CARTER DAY INDUSTRIES, INC.; 
COMBUSTION EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; 
COMBE FILL CORPORATION, 




(D.C. No. 2-98-cv-04781) 
 




BECKMAN COULTER, INC. f/k/a BECKMAN 
INSTRUMENTS, INC.; 
CADILLAC PLASTICS GROUP, INC.  
f/k/a/ Day International Corporation f/k/a Dayco Corporation; 
CWM CHEMICAL SERVICES, LLC;  
f/k/a/ Chem-Trol Pollution Services Inc.  
as successor R&R Sanitation, Inc. 
CHESTER HILLS, INC.; CHRYSLER CORPORATION;  
COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION; 
COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION OF 
CONNECTICUT, INC. 
COMPACTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
OF NEW JERSEY INC.; 
CONNECTICUT RESOURCE  
RECOVERY AUTHORITY, INC.; 
EAGLE INDUSTRICAL PRODUCTS, INC., 
 as successor to Falcon Manufacturing, Inc.;  
EAGLE INDUSTRIES, INC.;  
EASTERN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.; 
as successor to West Milford Haulage, Inc. and  
Frank Fenimore, Inc.; 
FALCON MANUFACTURING, INC.; 
JOHN C. FILIBERTO, in his individual capacity; 
JOSEPH B. FILIBERTO, in his individual capacity; 
GARBCO ASSOCIATES, INC.  
f/k/a Filiberto Sanitation, Inc.; 
HOWMET CORPORATION  
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a/k/a Howmet Turbine Components Corporation; 
MARS, INC.; THE MENNEN COMPANY;  
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION; 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM INC.; RAYONIER, INC.;  
WARNER-LAMBERT COMPANY INC.; 
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEW JERSEY, INC., 
as successor to J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. 
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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601, et seq., promotes the timely cleanup of hazardous sites 
by providing that Federal and State Governments cooperate 
with one another to remediate the sites and later recover costs 
from the parties responsible for polluting them.  Although the 
procedural history of this case is quite long, the parties present 
a single legal question: Whether a polluting party’s settlement 
with the State of New Jersey protects it from lawsuits seeking 
contributions toward expenditures made by the Federal 
Government on the same site?  Our answer here is no.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Statutory Background 
CERCLA “promote[s] the timely cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites and [] ensure[s] that the costs of such cleanup 
efforts [are] borne by those responsible for the contamination.”  
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 4 (2014) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The statute gives the 
President, acting through the Attorney General or the United 
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States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA1”), the 
power to identify and remediate contaminated sites.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9604.  To foster rapid cleanup, Congress adopted a 
policy of delaying litigation about costs until after a 
remediation plan is in place.  “Thus, under CERCLA, 
[responsible parties’] liability is not assessed until after the 
[US]EPA has investigated a site, decided what remedial 
measures are necessary, and determined which [parties] will 
bear the costs.”  In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35, 
37 (2d Cir. 1988).  
 “[S]tates play a critical role in effect[]ing the purposes 
of CERCLA.”  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron 
U.S.A., 596 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2010).  Section 104(d) 
authorizes the USEPA to “enter into contract[s] or cooperative 
agreement[s] with [a] State or political subdivision” to carry 
out response activities at the hazardous site.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(d)(1)(A).  Under these agreements, the State pays all 
operation and maintenance expenses, subject to reimbursement 
from the Federal Government of up to 90% of the State’s 
expenditures.  Id. § 9604(c)(3), (c)(5)(D).  Both the State and 
the Federal Governments may recover their clean-up costs 
directly from Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRPs”) under 
CERCLA Section 107(a).  Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).  In fact, 
“[u]nder CERCLA, [S]tates have causes of action independent 
from the [F]ederal [G]overnment[,]” Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., 596 F.3d at 126 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)), 
allowing them to act “as independent entities” without the 
express authorization of the USEPA, id. at 127.  Section 
107(a)(4)(B) makes a PRP strictly liable for “any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person,” so 
that the State and Federal Governments can recover fully from 
 
1 This term, “Federal Government” and “United 
States” are used interchangeably throughout our opinion. 
8 
 
a single PRP regardless of its share of the liability.  Id. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B).   
To enable PRPs to redistribute these costs, Congress 
amended CERLCA in 1986 to include Section 113, which 
provides that PRPs can seek contribution for an equitable share 
of response costs from other liable parties.  See United States 
v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 132 (2007) (citing 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113, 100 Stat. 1613, 1647–52 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 9613)).  In addition, to aid the recovery of clean-
up costs, Section 113(f)(2) gives PRPs that settle with the 
Federal or State Government protection from other PRPs’ 
contribution claims as long as those claims and the settlement 
address the same “matters.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).   
This is the key provision at issue in our case.  
Specifically, it provides that “[a] person who has resolved its 
liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for 
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”  
Id.  This contribution protection leaves “PRPs who do not join 
in a first-round settlement . . . with the risk of bearing a 
disproportionate share of liability[,] . . . a technique which 
promotes early settlements and deters litigation for litigation’s 
sake . . . .”  United States v. Charter Int’l Oil Co., 83 F.3d 510, 
515 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
B. Factual and Procedural Background  
 
1. The Combe Superfund Site 
From 1948 until 1981, the Combe Fill South Landfill 
Superfund Site (the “Site”), a 65-acre parcel located in Chester 
and Washington Townships, New Jersey, functioned as a 
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municipal landfill, converting waste into the hazardous 
substance “ECO-Fuel II.”  In 1978, Carter Day Industries, Inc.  
(“Carter Day”), then known as Combustion Equipment 
Associates, Inc., purchased and ran the Site through its 
subsidiary, the Combe Fill Corporation (“Combe Fill”), until it 
closed.  During this period, Combe Fill hired Compaction 
Systems Corporation of Connecticut, Inc. and Compaction 
Systems Corporation (collectively, “Compaction”) to conduct 
operations at and transport hazardous materials to the Site.  
This appeal pits appellants Compaction and the Federal 
Government against appellee Carter Day.  
In 1983, the USEPA added the Site to the National 
Priorities List for long-term remedial evaluation and response.  
As part of the cleanup effort, the USEPA and the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (the “NJDEP”) 
entered into a cooperative agreement (the “Cooperative 
Agreement”) that continues today and designates the NJDEP 
as the lead agency to oversee the Site’s cleanup.  Under this 
pact, the USEPA “contribute[d] one hundred percent (100%) 
of the cost of managing and performing” the remedial 
investigation and feasibility study and “ninety percent (90%) 
of the cost of managing and performing the work specified in 
[the remedial action],” with the NJDEP paying the other 10%.  
S.A. 34.  An amendment clarified that “[n]othing contained in 
this Cooperative Agreement shall be construed to create . . . the 
relationship of agency between [US]EPA and the State[,]” and 
expressly “negated and denied” the authority of either party to 
“attempt to negotiate on behalf of the other.”  S.A. 39–40.    
Over the decades, the USEPA incurred over $104 
million in costs at the Site, while the NJDEP separately spent 
$24 million.   




In 1981, just as the Site was closing, Combe Fill filed 
for Chapter 7 protection in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York.  Both the United States and the 
State of New Jersey filed claims in that case, which were 
settled separately for $50,000 each.  Combe Fill, its 
bankruptcy, and its settled claims are not directly at issue here.   
A year earlier, Carter Day filed in the same venue a 
separate petition for Chapter 11 protection.  The Bankruptcy 
Court disallowed New Jersey’s claim there because only 
Combe Fill was liable for the costs of cleaning up the Site 
under New Jersey law.  The United States did not file a claim 
against Carter Day in its bankruptcy case.  
In 1983, the USEPA notified Carter Day and roughly 
190 other entities that they were PRPs for the Site’s cleanup 
costs.  Carter Day sought a declaratory judgment in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York that it had 
discharged its CERCLA liability in its bankruptcy 
reorganization.  The District Court dismissed the case as 
unripe.  And on appeal the Second Circuit declined to exercise 
its discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act because, inter alia, the USEPA investigation of the Site 
was at a preliminary stage and deciding the claim prematurely 
would interfere with “Congress’s policy of expediting 
cleanup.”  In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d at 40.  
Accordingly, neither the NJDEP nor the USEPA’s claim 
against Carter Day was fully resolved at that time. 
3. The NJDEP Settlement with Carter Day 
In 1990, Carter Day filed another adversary proceeding 
in the SDNY Bankruptcy Court seeking a determination that 
the NJDEP claim had been discharged in bankruptcy.  It did 
not name the USEPA as a defendant.  The following year the 
Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement between Carter Day 
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and the NJDEP that discharged “all claim[s] of [the] NJDEP 
against Carter Day with respect to the [Site]” (the “NJDEP 
Settlement”).  J.A. 1339.  The parties agreed that “the prior 
disallowance of the NJDEP’s proof of claim in [Carter Day]’s 
Chapter 11 case had res judicata effect and barred the NJDEP’s 
claims.”  Id.  The NJDEP did not receive any additional money 
under the Settlement, nor was the USEPA party to it.  
4. The USEPA’s and the NJDEP’s Action against 
24 PRPs 
In 1998, the United States sued 24 PRPs—including 
Combe Fill’s contractor, Compaction—in the District Court 
for the District of New Jersey to recoup costs it incurred 
remediating the Site.  The NJDEP filed a similar lawsuit 
against many of the same defendants, and the two cases were 
consolidated before the District Court.   
The United States and the NJDEP entered into a global 
consent decree with the majority of the parties (including 
Compaction) in 2009 for $62.6 million, with the United States 
receiving 81.5% of the funds and the NJDEP receiving the 
remainder (the “Consent Decree”).  Compaction contributed 
$11 million, including over $6.8 million plus interest to the 
USEPA, over $1.5 million plus interest to the NJDEP, and over 
$433,000 for natural resources damages payable to the NJDEP 
as one of the natural resources trustees.  In addition, 
Compaction agreed to pay $900,000 per year in ongoing 
operation and maintenance expenses at the Site for a 30-year 
period.  Finally, it consented to a judgment of $26 million (the 
“Consent Judgment”), but is not obligated to pay any amount 
of the Consent Judgment unless its recoveries  from CERCLA 
contribution actions against other PRPs exceeded at least $11 
million plus certain attorneys’ fees.  Carter Day was not a party 
to either the Consent Decree or the Consent Judgment. 
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5. Compaction’s Contribution Action Against 
Carter Day 
Compaction filed an amended third-party complaint 
seeking contribution from Carter Day in 2011.  The latter 
moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted 
its motion without oral argument, reasoning that the NJDEP 
Settlement protected it from contribution.  The Court relied on 
our decision in Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013).  That case interpreted 
the language “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the 
United States or a State” in a different CERCLA provision, 
Section 113(f)(3)(B), to govern the rights of PRPs that resolve 
their liability with either the Federal or State Government 
rather than requiring resolution with both to apply.  Extending 
that reasoning to Compaction’s claim, the Court ruled that 
Carter Day’s settlement with the NJDEP barred Compaction 
from seeking contribution for its federal liability from Carter 
Day.   
Compaction moved for reconsideration, and the United 
States submitted a brief in support of that motion.  They argued 
that the Court failed to consider the effect of its holding given 
CERCLA’s allocation of responsibility between the Federal 
Government and the States, as well as the narrow scope of the 
“matters addressed” in the NJDEP Settlement.   
After determining that the parties did not satisfy the 
standards for reconsideration, the District Court denied the 
motion.  Compaction and the United States appeal to us in 
separate actions, consolidated here. 
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II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review anew a district court’s grant of a party’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 
904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018).  We will affirm if, drawing 
all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III. DISCUSSION  
 
A. The Federal Government’s Article III Standing to 
Appeal 
Compaction no doubt may appeal.  Carter Day 
challenges, however, whether, under Article III of the United 
States Constitution, the United States has standing to appeal 
the District Court’s grant of Compaction’s motion for 
summary judgment and denial of the latter’s motion to 
reconsider, to which the United States filed a brief in support.2  
 
 2 The United States is a party to the consolidated case in 
front of the District Court, but it never filed a formal motion to 
intervene in Compaction’s third-party claim against Carter 
Day.  In portions of two footnotes in Carter Day’s appellate 
brief it appears to argue the United States lacked statutory 
standing to appeal because it had not intervened in this specific 




Carter Day contends the Government’s potential recovery 
under the $26 million Consent Judgment derives from 
Compaction’s contribution actions and is contingent on 
Compaction recovering at least $11 million in contribution 
from other PRPs.  It argues that such a contingent financial 
interest does not confer standing.3   
 
vaguely presented without factual or legal support, it is 
forfeited for lack of development.  See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. 
v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(arguments made in passing, “such as, in a footnote,” are 
forfeited); see also IPSCO Steel (Alabama) v. Blaine Const. 
Corp., 371 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
statutory standing to appeal is non-jurisdictional).  Moreover, 
we have not directly held that in these circumstances the 
Federal Government needed to intervene.  See Bank of Am. 
Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 
F.2d 339, 341 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 
U.S. 1, 6–7 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who 
file a timely objection do not need to intervene to appeal); but 
cf. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (determining that 
a group testifying before the district court, but did not 
intervene, cannot appeal).   
 
3 At oral argument, Carter Day also argued that even if 
Compaction’s appeal is successful, it is impossible for 
Compaction to recover at least $11 million from Carter Day in 
order to permit the Government to recover any portion of  the 
$26 million Consent Judgment because, at a minimum, the 
NJDEP Settlement barred Compaction from recovering on the 
$1.5 million plus it paid the NJDEP.  Thus Compaction’s 




To establish standing, a party must have “(1) suffered 
an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 
S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
Carter Day asserts the Federal Government has not 
established an injury in fact, “the [f]irst and foremost of 
standing’s three elements,” id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  To establish this prong, “a [litigant] must 
show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected 
interest’ that is ‘concrete [real, not abstract] and particularized’ 
[personal,] and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’”  Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  This is to say the United 
States must “possess a ‘direct stake in the outcome’ of the 
case.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) 
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 
43, 64 (1997)).  “A purely speculative concern about the 
eventual result of a co-party’s case is likewise insufficient.”  
Morrison-Knudson Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 
(9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).4  
 
$9.5 million it (Compaction) paid the USEPA.  Compaction 
counters that it is also entitled to recover the full $26 million 
Consent Judgment from Carter Day and that it is seeking to 
recover additional sums from other PRPs, which could be 
added to moneys recovered from Carter Day.  As explained in 
below, we need not resolve these issues because the United 
States clearly has a financial interest in Compaction’s 
contribution actions.   
4 Carter Day analogizes this case to our decision in 





  The Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. is 
instructive.  There the Court held that Metropolitan, a 
developer with a contract to build multi-family housing, had 
shown an injury to itself even though it had yet to suffer any 
direct economic harm from the Village’s re-zoning decision 
(its contract to develop the property contained an out if it did 
not receive zoning clearance).  See 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977).  
The Court reasoned that, because the zoning was an absolute 
bar to the development of property and Metropolitan’s 
development plans were detailed and specific, it did not have 
 
Insurance Co., 641 F. App’x 181 (3d Cir. 2016).  We are not 
bound by non-precedential decisions, I.O.P. 5.7, but we take 
Carter Day’s point to be that a defendant lacks standing to 
appeal a court’s dismissal of a co-defendant’s claim.  While in 
some circumstances such an appeal may present an injury too 
speculative to confer standing, see, e.g., Morrison-Knudson, 
811 F.2d at 1209, it is possible to assert an interest in another 
party’s case that is sufficiently real to establish an injury in fact.  
For example, in International Multifoods Corp. v. Commercial 
Union Insurance Co., the Second Circuit held that Commercial 
Union had standing to challenge the district court’s grant of its 
co-defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  See 309 F.3d 
76, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2002).  Even though the district court’s 
order did not directly involve Commercial Union, it had “a 
significant financial stake in whether [its co-defendant] c[ould] 
be forced to cover any of Multifoods’ loss” because under New 
York law it (Commercial Union) had the equitable right to 
collect contributions from other insurers.  Id. at 89.  Similarly, 
here the Consent Judgment directly linked the Federal 
Government’s financial interest with the outcome of 
Compaction’s contribution claim against Carter Day.   
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to engage in “undue speculation as a predicate for finding that 
[Metropolitan] has the requisite personal stake in the 
controversy.”  Id. at 261–62.   
Similarly, here the District Court’s ruling stands as a 
barrier to the United States recovering on its $26 million 
Consent Judgment against Compaction.  If we grant the relief 
the United States seeks, the barrier will be largely removed.    
Thus the Federal Government has stated a traceable and 
redressable claim.  Though it is not certain that Compaction 
will ultimately collect from other PRPs at least $11 million in 
contribution actions, the court-approved Consent Decree 
binding it and the Federal Government ensures that the latter’s 
interest in this matter is not abstract.  The $26 million Consent 
Judgment also makes the United States’ interest in this appeal 
individualized rather than a general grievance or a mere matter 
of policy.   
We thus proceed to the merits of its appeal alongside 
that of Compaction. 
B. CERCLA Section 113(f)(2) and Compaction’s 
Contribution Claim 
As discussed above, the District Court found that Carter 
Day’s settlement with the NJDEP pertained to the entire Site; 
hence it precluded contribution suits against Carter Day by 
other PRPs under Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA regardless 
whether they sought recovery for Federal or State liability.  To 
repeat, that provision provides that “[a] person who has 
resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be 
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed 
in the settlement.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).  Compaction 
acknowledges that Carter Day’s settlement with the NJDEP 
precludes Compaction from seeking contributions for its 
18 
 
liability to that State agency, roughly $1.5 million plus interest.  
Instead, Compaction’s sole contention is that the “matters 
addressed” in the NJDEP Settlement with Carter Day do not 
include claims by the USEPA, and thus Compaction can seek 
contribution for that portion of its payments under the Consent 
Decree.  Accordingly, we must determine the scope of the 
“matters addressed” in the NJDEP Settlement and whether it 
covers Carter Day’s liability to the Federal Government.   
1. The Scope of the “Matters Addressed” 
But for the general instruction to “us[e] such equitable 
factors as the court determines are appropriate” in resolving 
contribution claims, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), CERCLA does 
not specify how to determine what matters are addressed by a 
consent decree.  Moreover, the NJDEP Settlement does not 
include an explicit “matters addressed” section.5  “In the 
absence of explicit language, . . . one must . . . look elsewhere 
to determine ‘matters addressed.’”  Charter Int’l Oil Co., 83 
F.3d at 517.  “[C]ourts have suggested that the ‘matters 
addressed’ by a consent decree be determined with reference 
to the particular location, time frame, hazardous substances, 
and clean-up costs covered by the agreement.”  Akzo Coatings, 
Inc., v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(collecting cases).  This list is non-exhaustive, leaving a 
consent decree’s scope “[to] be assessed in a manner consistent 
 
5 In 1997, the USEPA and Justice Department published 
guidance recommending that settlement agreements include an 
explicit definition of “matters addressed” “that clarifies the 
parties’ intent regarding the scope of contribution protection.”  
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Envtl Prot. Agency, Defining 





with both the reasonable expectations of the signatories and the 
equitable apportionment of costs that Congress has 
envisioned.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
We have previously explained that  “[i]n light of 
Congress’s intent to induce settlements, all settlement[s] 
should be presumed to afford to the settlors protection against 
claims for contribution regarding an entire site, unless there is 
an explicit provision to the contrary.”  United States v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 235 F.3d 817, 823 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting John 
M. Hyson, CERCLA Settlements, Contribution Protection and 
Fairness to Non–Settling Responsible Parties, 10 Vill. Envtl. 
L.J. 277, 320 (1999)).   
But this does not tell us which sovereigns are covered 
by a settlement.  That inquiry raises additional concerns 
outside of inducing settlements.  For example, in Akzo 
Coatings, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether Section 
113(f)(2) protected Aigner, a PRP that had settled with state 
and federal agencies, from contribution actions for remedial 
costs borne by Akzo, another PRP, outside of the governmental 
spending.  30 F.3d at 764–70.  In those circumstances, it 
reasoned, reading the matters addressed in the settlement 
broadly “would defeat the policy of CERCLA[,]” as neither the 
Federal Government nor the party settling its claims had proper 
incentive to protect another PRP’s contribution rights.  Id. at 
769 (citation omitted).  Thus “it [is] prudent to require the 
settling parties to be more explicit when they intend to bar 
contribution for work” performed outside of those parties’ 
efforts.  Id. at 768.  
Applying Akzo’s logic here, we interpret the matters 
addressed in an agreement narrowly when determining 
whether settlement with one sovereign covers the claims of 
another.  Carter Day entered the NJDEP Settlement to cover all 
claims “with respect to the [Site]” and those “arising out of or 
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related to the [Site].”  J.A. 1339.  Although this language is 
broad, the Settlement, by its own terms, concerns only liability 
to the NJDEP.  Id.  (“Carter Day was discharged . . . from all 
liabilities to NJDEP[.]”).  Thus, despite its broad language 
referring to all remedial costs connected to the Site, the 
agreement’s specific language regarding the NJDEP ties only 
to the State’s expenditures.  
In addition, looking to the reasonable expectations of 
the parties, it is sensible to limit the protection under the 
NJDEP Settlement to New Jersey’s claims.  As Compaction 
explains, the NJDEP Settlement “merely reflects a decision by 
NJDEP to acquiesce to [Carter Day’s] position that [the 
NJDEP] was barred from proceeding with any claims” as a 
result of Carter Day’s bankruptcy case, in which the USEPA 
took no part.  Compaction Br. 29–30.  It would have been 
unreasonable for either the NJDEP or Carter Day to expect that 
the NJDEP Settlement addressed any liability stemming from 
the USEPA’s clean-up costs.6 
 
6 Carter Day argues that the United States’ decision not 
to pursue a claim against it over the past 30 years “indicates 
that it too regarded any claims against [Carter Day] as 
resolved.” Carter Day Br. 30.  As the Federal Government was 
not a party to the NJDEP Settlement, its decisions have no 
bearing on the parties’ reasonable expectations.  Further, just 
because the United States had an opportunity to intervene in 
the litigation between the NJDEP and Carter Day, see 42 
U.S.C. § 9622(i) (requiring a public notice and comment 
period before final settlement), and chose not to, does not mean 
that its claim was resolved.  That does not affect how we 
interpret the matters addressed in the NJDEP Settlement or 




Further, allowing Carter Day to avoid liability for any 
federal expenditures would not equitably apportion the 
remedial costs.  The USEPA bore the lion’s share of the Site’s 
cleanup costs.  It was responsible for the remediation and 
investigation costs, and though the State pays all operation and 
maintenance expenses, the Federal Government reimburses 
90% of those costs as well.  42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3), (c)(5)(D).  
Affirming the District Court would allow a party to avoid 
massive liability by settling with an agency responsible for 
10% of the total sticker price.   
2. CERCLA’s Purpose and Procedures 
“[T]he two major policy [goals] underlying CERCLA 
are ensuring that prompt and effective clean-ups are put into 
place and making sure that the PRPs responsible for the 
hazards created bear their approximate share of the 
responsibility.”  Charter Int’l Oil Co., 83 F.3d at 522.  In other 
words, be quick and share the costs.  To implement these goals, 
CERCLA “also aims to induce those parties who settle earlier 
to do so for higher amounts than they might otherwise by 
assuring them the right to seek contribution protection from 
those who have not as yet settled.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Carter Day argues that construing narrowly the scope of 
its settlement protection affronts CERCLA’s goal of 
incentivizing early settlement.  While we acknowledge that our 
decision here could affect a PRP’s incentive to settle, 
ultimately it vindicates CERCLA’s goal of equitably 
distributing liability without extinguishing incentives to settle.  
 
was not named in, and opted to stay out of, Carter Day’s 
bankruptcy adds support to the argument that it and the parties 
understood the matters addressed in the NJDEP Settlement to 
relate only to the NJDEP’s portion of the remedial 
expenditures.   
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As we indicated above, a settling-PRP is protected only insofar 
as a consent decree and a contribution action address the same 
matters.  In effect, our decision encourages a PRP to settle with 
both the relevant State and Federal Governments.  
Further, construing the NJDEP Settlement to apply only 
to NJDEP’s claims avoids creating perverse incentives for a 
PRP to resolve those claims only in the hope of barring other 
PRPs from seeking contribution on federal claims.  As noted 
above, that outcome would be a boon to industry, as the 
statutory scheme allocates the vast majority of the clean-up 
costs to the Federal Government. 
Carter Day argues that we should not be worried about 
these distortions because the District Court did not say that 
NJDEP resolved the United States’ claims against it; thus the 
USEPA could still seek to recover costs directly from it under 
CERCLA Section 107(a).  42 U.S.C. § 9607 (providing a 
government can recover from PRPs cleanup costs it incurred).  
While that is true, it also runs afoul of the statute’s procedures.  
The statutory scheme incentivizes the State and Federal 
Governments to recover fully from a single PRP, after which 
that PRP can litigate the proper allocation of liability among 
other PRPs.  This reduces litigation directly involving the 
States and the Federal Government.  If we were to affirm the 
District Court, taxpayer-funded litigation by the Federal 
Government would undoubtedly increase.   
Finally, our decision aligns with CERCLA Section 104, 
which outlines how the Federal Government is to work with 
the States to coordinate remedial actions and makes clear that 
costs borne by the United States and New Jersey are distinct.  
42 U.S.C. § 9604(c).  The USEPA-NJDEP Cooperative 
Agreement for the Site reiterates the statutory allocation of 
costs and states that the NJDEP cannot recover funds on behalf 
of the USEPA, and vice versa.  It defies reason and the plain 
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language of the Cooperative Agreement that the matters 
addressed in the NJDEP Settlement with Carter Day could 
include expenditures incurred—per statute and contract—
solely by the United States.   
In addition, the breakdown of payments among PRPs in 
the Consent Decree illustrates the separate nature of each 
sovereign’s costs.  Approximately $1.5 million of 
Compaction’s $11 million settlement related, and was paid, to 
the NJDEP.  Thus, despite Carter Day’s contention that 
requiring courts to distinguish between State and Federal 
clean-up costs at a site “would put an almost impossible burden 
on a district court to parse out what ‘type’ of claim was 
made[,]”  Carter Day Br. 35, we have no difficulty 
distinguishing between State and Federal liability here.   
* * * * * 
Our interpretation of the scope for the “matters 
addressed,” as well as CERCLA’s purpose and procedures, tell 
us the NJDEP Settlement cannot protect Carter Day from 
contribution actions by other PRPs related to federal liability.  
The scope of the NJDEP Settlement resolves “all liabilities [of 
Carter Day] to [the] NJDEP.”  J.A. 1339.  We do not believe it 
discharged liabilities to the USEPA.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the District Court’s summary judgment order and its denial of 
Compaction’s motion to reconsider, and remand the case for 
further proceedings.   
 
 
